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Washington, D.C.
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Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner and Members of the Subcommittee,
Thank you for having me back to testify about ECPA reform and specifically about the issues
relating to cloud computing, which make up a large component of my legal practice. As the
committee knows, I worked as a Trial Attorney in the United States Department of Justice
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section from 1997‐2000, and for the last ten years I
have been representing companies, including internet service providers, social networking
companies, and wireless providers on issues related to the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (“ECPA”). In my career, I have taught hundreds of law enforcement agents how to apply
ECPA and hundreds of compliance paralegals at leading Internet providers how to respond to
law enforcement requests for data. I have also litigated ECPA‐related issues in federal district
and appellate courts. As an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington, D.C., I have taught courses covering ECPA. I have also been involved in the Digital
Due Process Coalition effort for the last 2 years. I am testifying today solely in my individual
capacity and not on behalf of any clients or the Digital Due Process Coalition.
As someone who deals with the real world application of ECPA on a daily basis, I am acutely
aware of the strengths and the failings of the statute. Although each of the proposed areas for
ECPA reform are important, the most pressing area for legislative action relates to the storage
of user data with third party Internet providers, often referred to as storage “in the cloud.”
As the testimony from industry representatives will likely make clear, Internet companies
are struggling to apply the existing and somewhat outdated categories of information
protected by ECPA to their products and services. Back in 1986 when ECPA was passed,
companies may have been outsourcing the processing of certain data, but not on the same
scale as today. Moreover, individuals were not using third‐party services like Yahoo! Mail,
Google Documents, or Flickr to store their most private correspondence, writings and photos,
nor were they communicating regularly through social networking services. The increasing use
of the Internet as a primary repository for users’ private documents has made the issue of
privacy and law enforcement access to such materials of significant importance to individuals
who use the services, companies that offer the services, and to law enforcement. Given the
widespread use of cloud computing by U.S. citizens and businesses, the laws governing access
to user data should be clear and easy to apply. The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) is
exactly the opposite. In fact, the distinctions and categorizations contained in the 1986 statute
often make little or no sense in today’s environment. Through my testimony, I intend to
explain five fundamental problems with how the SCA applies to cloud computing and why this
Committee should consider passing new legislation to address these issues.1

1

Four of the five issues are addressed in the Digital Due Process (“DDP”) principles. The issue that is not addressed
pertains to access to communications by non‐government actors, such as civil litigants and criminal defendants.

1

1. For materials such as emails or private messages that are intended to be the most
protected, the definition of “Electronic Storage” is difficult to apply.
Take a moment to consider the types of emails that are in your own inboxes. If you are a
typical email user, the emails or private messages that are both the most important and the
most private are the older messages that you have read through several times and have
intentionally decided to save. These emails might include treasured notes from a spouse, a
child, or a close friend. By contrast, the unopened emails in your inbox are likely to be
commercial solicitations that you have not yet had time to delete. Unfortunately, under the
current structure and interpretation of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), the latter
messages are clearly protected from government access except when law enforcement obtains
a search warrant. The protection for the more important messages – the ones you purposely
chose to save – however, is much less certain or is insufficient. Let me explain why.
The SCA affords the highest protection to materials that are in “electronic storage” for 180
days or less by preventing the government from accessing these types of communications
without a search warrant. The SCA defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any temporary
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication. . . . “ 18
U.S.C. § 2510(17). Email communications meeting either condition (A) or (B) and that are less
than 181 days old are protected from disclosure to anyone except to the government pursuant
to a search warrant.
Under this definition of “electronic storage,” the Department of Justice has taken the
position that a search warrant is required only for messages that have never been read or
opened by a user. This argument is based on the theory that when an email has been
downloaded to a user’s computer, the storage by the ISP is no longer temporary or
intermediate, because a copy of the message has been delivered to the user.
When the SCA was passed in 1986, this type of distinction may have made some sense. In
the 1980s, ISPs would store user email on their systems only briefly until the user connected to
the ISP and downloaded the mail. That brief storage was temporary and intermediate, as
described in the definition of electronic storage. Today, however, webmail is the predominant
form of personal email communication and webmail is seldom delivered to a user for local
storage on his or her own PC.2 Rather, it stays in the cloud and the user interacts with the mail
on the provider’s servers. The ability to access webmail from mobile devices and portable
computers is one of the chief advantages of webmail and is one reason why webmail has come
to dominate the non‐business user email market. But for webmail providers, there is no longer
any “temporary intermediate” storage in the manner initially contemplated by the statute.
Rather, whether or not a user reads an email, it will continue to be stored in the cloud
forever—or at least so long as the user’s account is active. Thus, the act of “reading” the email
is of no legal moment, because it does not transform the storage from “temporary” to
2
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permanent. Nor does the user’s action or inaction have any impact on the physical location of
the email – it remains on the provider’s servers and is not downloaded to a computer that is
within the realm of what is covered by the user’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Over DOJ’s objection, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended the definition of
electronic storage to all emails stored by an ISP – whether read or unread – under the theory
that even after any “temporary” period of storage has ended, any further storage by the ISP is
within the backup prong of the definition of electronic storage because it is a “backup” for the
user.3 This is the correct outcome as a policy matter – the statutory protections for email
should not vary depending on whether the email has been delivered or read, yet, the
Department of Justice takes issue with this position and continues to seek to compel the
production of opened mail by subpoena in all judicial districts except the Ninth Circuit.4 In fact,
earlier this year I was poised to litigate this issue against the U.S. Attorney’s office in Colorado
after it moved to compel Yahoo! to respond to a subpoena for emails that were less than 180
days old but which the user had not read. After Yahoo! filed its opposition to the motion to
compel and amicus briefs had been submitted supporting Yahoo!’s position, the government
withdrew its motion.
Lest any future courts accept the Department’s position, the SCA should be amended to
remove any question that the standard the government has to meet in order to access email is
not dependent on whether the email is opened or unopened.
2. The 180 day rule is arbitrary and based on a false assumption
Like the purported distinction between opened and unopened mail, the provision in ECPA
that automatically diminishes a user’s protection vis‐a‐vis the government as email ages is
arbitrary and irrational. Under the SCA, private messages or emails 180 days or older may be
obtained by the government with a mere subpoena or a § 2703(d) order with prior notice,
unless such notice is authorized to be delayed. However, law enforcement must obtain a
warrant to obtain emails stored with a provider for 180 days or less. This may have made sense
in 1986, but it is no longer rational, much less compelling.
At the time ECPA was passed in 1986, data sent through an electronic communication
system was not stored by the provider for long periods of time.5 Thus, if not already deleted
by the ISP, any data stored for more than 180 days was not deemed to be the type of data
worth protecting. Emails over 180 days old were likely unread emails that no user had
bothered to retrieve and download to their own computer – probably most often associated
3
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See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence Manual, Chap. 3, a
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5

See H.R. Rep. No. 99‐647 at 65 (“Most—if not all—electronic communication systems (such as electronic mail
systems), however, only keep copies for a few months.”)

3

with dormant or abandoned accounts. In fact, it was expressly assumed that storage of that
duration would make the private email more akin to a business record of the ISP than content
belonging to the user.6 The intervening years, however, have proven that the original
assumption was incorrect. Online storage services for all types of communications, including
music, files, photos, and emails, have become the rule and storage capacity in the cloud is
virtually unlimited with little or no financial cost to the user. Thus, a user who stores online
content for more than 180 days, is now more, not less, likely to have a strong interest in that
data, and no one would consider such data to be merely a business record of the ISP. Yet the
Stored Communications Act still contains the original arbitrary six month dividing line for
privacy protection such that even materials that are obtainable only through a search warrant
for the first 180 days of their existence become obtainable via a subpoena (with prior or
delayed notice) on the 181st day. This is true despite the fact that it remains a criminal offense
for a third party to hack into an email system and obtain access to the same message regardless
of its age.7 This arbitrary time limit on privacy should be eliminated.
3. Congress intended content to be more protected than transactional records in theory,
but in practice content does not get enough protection.
Lawyers who work regularly with ECPA generally describe the statute as providing greater
protection for content, like photos, than for transactional or subscriber records, like log files.
This can be clearly seen by the fact that the highest level of protection under the SCA is
reserved for the contents of communications in electronic storage and the lowest for certain
limited types of basic subscriber records that are identified in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2), which
consist of: name, address, telephone records, length and type of service, other subscriber
number or identity including any network address, and means and source of payment.
Of the two other categories in the SCA, the protection for the contents of communications
stored by a remote computing service was intended to be at least as robust, if not more, than
the protection provided to transactional records. This is not, however, the way ECPA works in
practice. When Congress passed ECPA, it expected that the means by which the government
would get access to the types of private content not deemed to be “in electronic storage” ─
such as files stored with a remote computing service ─ was through a court order under 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d) or a subpoena with prior notice to the user. With such prior notice, a user
would know of the request for his or her documents and would have the opportunity for prior
judicial review before the contents of the account were turned over – either by the court who
initially issued the order, or subsequently if the user challenged the request. The delayed
notice provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2705 were intended to be used sparingly, as the requirement of
prior notice to the subscriber was identified as an important statutory protection provided to
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the user. 8 By contrast, when requesting transactional data or subscriber data not specifically
listed in § 2703(c)(2), the government was not required to give user notice, even though the
same basic showing was required.
But, in modern law enforcement practice, it often works the opposite way – transactional
data receives more protection than the contents of files stored by a remote computing service.
By regularly relying on the exception in the SCA that allows it to delay notice to the subscriber
whenever there is a “written certification of a supervisory official” that providing notice would
have an adverse effect on the investigation, the government can obtain contents of stored files
with a subpoena, when transactional records require a court order under § 2703(d). And users
whose content is sought by subpoena have no opportunity to challenge the request before
production. As a result, contents of files and messages ─ except those that are in electronic
storage for 180 days or less – are easier to obtain than transactional records. This switch in
protection from the way ECPA was originally designed is significant in light of the vast amount
of user data that is currently stored in the cloud.
In revisiting ECPA, Congress should make clear that a subpoena with delayed notice is
not an acceptable way to access the contents of any private stored content belonging to a user
by requiring the government instead to demonstrate probable cause before gaining access to
such content.9
4. The SCA is not technology neutral
One reason why the standard for law enforcement access for private stored content should
be reevaluated is to make the SCA truly technology neutral. When choosing between storing
documents locally on an individual’s own PC, or using a password‐protected storage service in
the cloud, the key considerations should relate to efficiency, accessibility, security and cost, not
law enforcement’s ability to access the data from a third party. That is not the situation today.
The SCA pushes a personal or business user seeking to protect his or her data from access by
third‐parties, including the government, towards choosing a local storage option to maximize
the protection for the data. If a business owner stores confidential files on a local server, the
government must either execute a search warrant or serve a subpoena for the documents,
allowing the personal or business user who receives the subpoena to have an opportunity to
object to the subpoena or assert relevant privileges. By contrast, if those same files are stored
with a third‐party provider in the cloud, the government could serve a lesser form of process on
the provider with delayed notice and prevent the business owner from learning the documents
had been subpoenaed until after they had already been provided to the government.
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The purported justification for decreased privacy protection where the documents are
hosted in the cloud is the third‐party doctrine: that documents that a user has knowingly
shared with a third‐party are understood to be less private. But that assumption is flawed in
several respects. First, as a practical matter, documents stored in the cloud may be more
secure than documents stored on a local server. For example, third‐party technology providers
generally spend more time and resources securing data than the average user does on his or
her home PC where they may be unprotected from intrusion or secured only by a firewall that
the user is not particularly adept at configuring, without an intrusion detection system or 24
hour monitoring. Second, by storing data on password‐protected third party systems, users
are not generally providing the third party with any broad right to review, access or disclose the
data for its own purposes. In fact, the third‐party generally has limited rights to automatically
screen data for harmful or malicious content that may cause damage to their network, and no
rights to access the private files. Thus, users should not be considered to have waived the
confidentiality of private documents by hosting them in the cloud. In fact they may be
enhancing their confidentiality compared to storing them on a home PC where other household
members could view them when using the computer. Consequently, as a policy matter, there is
no legitimate reason for U.S. law to provide more robust privacy protections for users who elect
local storage over secure storage in the cloud.10
5. The complete silence on access by civil litigants, criminal defendants and estates of
deceased users creates uncertainty and unnecessary litigation
An often overlooked but increasingly important issue associated with the application of the
SCA is access by civil litigants, criminal defendants and estates of deceased users. In the course
of representing Internet service providers, I have witnessed firsthand the confusion that is the
result of the absence of guidance in the SCA regarding access by civil litigants and criminal
defense counsel and how frequently ISPs receive unlawful subpoenas seeking to compel
production of the contents of Internet communications.
The SCA contains clear and unequivocal prohibitions on disclosure of both types of content
records that may be in the possession and control of a third‐party ISP: materials in “electronic
storage” and “contents of wire or electronic communications in a remote computing service.”
There are eight specific exceptions to these prohibitions that provide specific avenues for
disclosure to government entities, disclosures based on consent, or disclosures by the ISP in
order to render service or forward communications. However, there is not a single provision
that authorizes any type of disclosure of customer communications in response to legal process
issued by a civil litigant or criminal defendant. 11
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When ISPs inform civil litigants and criminal defendants, as they must, that federal law
precludes them from disclosing the communications without the consent of the author or
recipient; they invariably meet resistance and are sometimes forced to litigate these issues.
Even judges are astounded that they have not been given the power, under any circumstances,
to require the production of email content by an ISP in a civil case. In recent years, the storage
of increasing amounts of content in the cloud has only increased the importance of addressing
these issues.
The problem is even more complicated when a criminal defendant seeks information,
where this lack of access may lead to due process concerns. Because ECPA contains a flat
prohibition against the disclosure of contents of communications to non‐governmental entities,
criminal defendants have no mechanism to obtain emails even when there is no subscriber who
can consent to the disclosure. One solution is to rely on law enforcement to request the data
on a criminal defendant’s behalf, but in some cases, defense attorneys are unwilling to disclose
their defense strategy to the government and in others, the prosecutors are unwilling to
cooperate. Judges, for their part, can be reluctant based on separation of power issues to
require the government to use its investigative powers at the behest of a defendant to retrieve
the materials. And the third‐parties who sent or received these emails may be unwilling or
unable to consent to their disclosure.
For this reason, some trial courts in California have issued bench orders and oral rulings
finding that the restrictions in ECPA threaten to interfere with the defendant’s constitutional
rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, civil litigants are equally
stymied by the prohibitions of the SCA. Although many problems are solved by requiring the
civil party to serve their discovery subpoena on the third‐party who is the account holder,
rather than the ISP, there are some circumstances where the account holder is a third‐party
who is not within the court’s jurisdiction, or is unable to access their account to obtain the
emails, or is deceased. These situations often lead to litigation. I am currently involved in a
case in Massachusetts where my client has been sued for a declaratory judgment to declare
that the emails in a deceased user’s account should be turned over as property of the estate.
Even if the plaintiffs succeed in invalidating the ‘no right of survivorship’ clause in the contract,
the ISP would be barred under ECPA from disclosing the contents of the emails, and would be
forced to appeal the decision.
ECPA clearly needs an escape valve of some sort to allow for disclosure of the contents of
communications or stored files in very limited and narrow circumstances. I have previously
proposed the text of such an escape valve in a law review article12 about the SCA in 2007,
whereby a criminal defendant or civil litigant would be able to seek a court order to obtain
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stored content after making a rigorous showing that other methods of gaining access to the
data have been unsuccessful, that the information is relevant and material to the case and that
the subscriber/user and the ISP have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard. I
continue to believe the addition of such a provision would reduce some of the confusion and
unnecessary litigation generated by the current law.
ECPA has functioned fairly well during its first 20 years in striking the right balance between
law enforcement needs and the privacy expectation of U.S. citizens. But when it was initially
passed in 1986, Congress recognized that the “law must advance with the technology to ensure
the continued vitality of the fourth amendment.”13 Based on my experience as an ECPA
practitioner for the past 13 years, I believe the time is ripe for another advancement. I hope
you will consider these perspectives in crafting legislation that balances law enforcement needs
and user privacy in a manner that reflects the reality of the uses of the Internet in the 21st
century and no longer relies on outdated assumptions.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased to work with the
Committee in more detail as the ECPA reform process moves forward.
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